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l ^ u l fro~i ny y-irror^l aut.hc r s . d i < ^ t e A'fl-r ccr:si:ie:vAi \-: X ^ ! l fr i rw r«:r: r^l a t. c r s .d i fp^tes in hr.nz an.i d i c t a t e 
the fol lcwinr j.n.".truct±x')S to j,y or-j'-her ..oel b^c-uisc 1 t r u s t t h a t lie wi.11 fellow 
;\y orders a f t r r zKy i f enc ing demise. 
1 have not t a k e any ..lodicat?-^n in the l a$ t 2L hours excrr t tv.no r a in :111s 1 hr apo. 
This has very s l i r h t l y affoct c :rv? leers in locorootioji}. 1 ref^ort t:\i.c to say tha t 
1 a;, of a c le •:• an; sobor and i n Kialdn.: the fcllcvdny dec la ra t ion . 
I have a aebt owe.; to me by r;. Drotner Wendell concerning his house on Sh i r ec l i f f i n . 
in SLC. I w i l l leave wth i.:y v a i l D.-nefajtors ins t ruc t ions tha t a l l f inanc ia l 
o b l i f a t i o n s tha t he (Wendell) has vdth *>e arc to oc cancelled a t my passing. This 
statement i s rriy u l t ima te u e s i r e concerning t l d s obl iga t ion . 
This I do because I be l i eve t ha t i n the pres .nee of cer ta in peo*le and by t h e i r 
i n s t r u c t i o n s future w r i t t e n nego t i a t i en s :.ay oe a t t e s t e d to be made whil« I air undi-r 
the influence of medicines or coorcicn and not of ny c lear , f r ee , and sober ce s i r ' - - . 
This I deeply and p o s i t i v e l y brieve could or v.i l l happen. 
I a lso order , i n continued sobr i e ty , t ha t i f t rds ins t ruc t ion i s n ' t carr ied out by .r--
benefactos , a? c l e a r l y d i r ec t ed t o the. . , t h a t Wendell be compensate d i n t r eb le for al l 
expenses7 l e g a l and ord inary , he has incurred or w i l l incur in resiLtin-; the dwellirr 
deo:. problem as v/ell as the cancelled d e b t . This I have verbal ly exr^recse:' to so : e . 
I handle t i l s with you, r<oel, and not vdth Wendell d i r ec t l y for personal rea ens 
I won't expla in . Here-in i s the documentary re-statement of t h i s or : .er . 
Also, I handle t h i s sub jec t t i l s way i n the hopes tha t the p r i n c i p a l d era re of .vine 
t o be consumated i s 'chat Wendell w i l l be f ree ; of f inancia l ob l iga t ions to :•=» find or 
my e s t a t e . I handlv i t i d t ; . you
 A-<oel. so t h a t i f a l l goes as 1 des i re and as i n s t ruc t s 
by ::.e t h a t t h i s docuMs.r;. be destro?.red witneut reve la t ion , i surgest t o you
 ; .oel a 
snor t period of wai t ing a f t e r ;ny pa^sinj; t o present t h i s docurrat , i f n e ^ e d , in o r ' e r 
to see an accurate p i c t u r e oi the develop...eats i f a rroDir-:;; a r i s e s . :our judgenett 
i n t l d s . 
I t r u s t you i-,o':l as a cou r f i e r and witness to an:i for t h i s order . 
I order the aoove explained cance l l a t ion of de»-t of Wendell to rr.e or to r* e s t a t e 
as part of nr- Fii-al Wi l l And Testarnet anc) t h i s order sna i l supersede any Previous 
order of ::dne or any subsequent order of rnine or anyone else on t h i s mat te r . 
yi 
Soberly an., f r e e l y d ic ta te . , by S ^ V ^ ^ 
Grant R. Tav^or 
Typod as d i c t a t ed an'. witnesssd pf ) / / 
"' <M:1<(< (c^-'o 
l-.oel . . vaylor ( / 
EXHIBIT _fl 
i 
30 June 1904 
After consideration 1 rer.d from :.iy pergonal authorship notes in hand and dictate 
the following instructions to iny brother „oel becaurv I trust that he vail follow 
my orders after my i. ipendng deiidse. 
1 have not taken any Medication in the la .t 2U hours except two pain rills 1 hr ago. 
This has very slightly affect d my legs in loco!,.otioii. 1 report tide to say that 
I am of a clenr ani sober rdnd in making the follo:an;ff, declaration. 
I have a debt owed to mo by my brotner Wen Jell concerning his house on Shirecldff Ln. 
in SLC* I will leave wtji my vail benefactors instructions that all financial 
obligations that he (Wendell) has vdth iwe are to be cancelled at my passing. This 
statement is my ultimate desire concerning this obligation. 
This I do because 1 believe that in the pres nee of certain peo* le an I by their 
inst uctions future written negotiations .\ay be atteiiitei to be made while I am under 
the influence of medicines or coercion and n t of ;i:y cLar, free, and sober desires. 
This I deeply and positively beieve could or vail hap-pen. 
I also order, in continued sobriety, that if tnis instruction isn't carried out by nry 
benefactos, as clearly airected to then., that Wendell be compensated in treble for all 
expenses^ legal and ordinary, he has incurred or vail incur in resisting the dwelling 
debt problem as well as the cancelled debt. This I have verbally expressed to some. 
I handle tlds with you, i\»oel, and not vdth Wendell directly for personal reasons 
1 won't explain. Here-in is the documentary re-staten.ent of this orier. 
Also, I handle tlds subject tlds way in the hopes that the principal desire of mine 
to be consumated is that Wendell will be free i of financial obligations to me and or 
my estate. I handle it vdth you noel so that if all goes as 1 desire and as instructs 
by me that ttds document be destroyed vathout revelation. 1 suggest to you noel a 
short period of v;aiting after my passing LO present this document, if needed, in order 
to see an accurate picture of the developments if a nrob.b •:.-. arises. Your judgement 
in this. 
I trust you ^ool as a courfier and v;itness to ani for tlds order. 
I order the above explained cancellation of de«»t of 'Vendell to me or to my estate 
as part of mv Final Will And Testamot ani this order shall supersede any previous 
order of mdne or any suusequent order of ;.dne or an "• .10 else on tlds matter. 
Soberly and freely dictated b y ^ x O / ) /_ 
Grant It. TavJLor 
) 
yt 
Typed as d i c t a t e d ani v.\i tries: :\\ \rf 
, , <*V1<( (C 
i;ocl . Taylor 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL E. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR, 
deceased, ESTHER TAYLOR, 
DARRON G. TAYLOR, and JOHN 
DOES 1 through 5. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. C85-6869 
Judge: Raymond Uno 
FACTS 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
The June 30, 1984 "Will and/or Codicil" was properly 
executed in substantial compliance with the necessary 
requisites and should therefore be admitted to probate. 
The requirements for proper execution of a will in Utah are 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-502 as follows: 
Except as provided for holographic wills, writings 
within section 75-2-573, and wills within section 75-2-
506, every will shall be in writing signed by the 
testator or in the testator's name by some other person 
EXHIBIT _C 
in the testator's presence and by his direction, and 
shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom 
witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowl-
edgement of the signature or of the will. The signing 
by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence and 
in the presence of each other. 
This statutory provision was enacted in 1975 and was 
essentially an adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. The above 
provision is identical to section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate 
Code except for the addition by the Utah Legislature of the final 
sentence. (Editorial Board Comment to UCA § 75-2-502). It is 
compliance with this final sentence of the Utah provision which 
is contested in the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in 
the present case. 
Defendant's in their Memorandum cite the purpose of such a 
provision is to guard against fraud - Defendant's Memorandum, 
P.9; 94 CJS. § Wills 189. Defendant's then rely heavily on the 
language used by the Utah Supreme Court in In re. Alexander's 
Estate, 139 P.2d 432 (Utah 1943). There the court stated: 
[T]he right to dispose of property by will is governed 
and controlled entirely by statute. Such statutes are 
mandatory, and, unless strictly complied with, the 
instrument, as a will, is void. 
139 P.2d at 434. While it appears that the above-quoted language 
is non-bending, Plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to 
consider several additional factors and similar judicial 
2 
authority that would lead to a more equitable and just interpre-
tation of the current statute governing execution of wills in 
Utah. 
The case of In re. Alexander's Estate is a 1943 case. It 
did not involve the present uniform Probate Code. The testatrix' 
will was declared invalid where the testatrix had not signed the 
will in the presence of the witnesses, as strictly required by 
statute, but she had definitely acknowledged to the witnesses 
that the instrument was her will. The decision was a very close 
3-2 decision with Justices Wade and Moffat dissenting. In his 
dissenting opinion Justice Wade stressed the importance of 
another Utah Statute which provided that the statutes of this 
state be construed liberally and in a manner to promote justice. 
139 P.2d at 434. Justice Wade, in reviewing the facts of the 
case, stated that although the testatrix had failed to comply 
strictly with the statutory requirements, she clearly thought she 
had made a valid will and desired disposition of her property 
according to her purported will. He then concluded that: 
the legislative intent that our statutes shall "be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects 
of the statutes and to promote justice"... was undoubt-
edly enacted to prevent the harsh results of following 
too literally the exact wording of the statutes, and, 
to my mind, was made for just such a case as we have 
here. 
139 P.2d at 434. Justice Moffat concurred in the dissent. 
3 
The current Utah Code has a similar statute governing construc-
tion of this states statutes. Section 68-3-2 states in part: 
The statutes establish the laws of this state respect-
ing the subjects to which they relate, and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects 
of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions as that 
of Justice Wade. In "In re. Rudd's Estate, 369 P.2d 526 (Mont. 
1962) , the Montana Supreme Court, interpreting a similar wills 
statute, stated: 
This Court has held that the right to make a will 
depends upon the consent of the legislature and there 
must be strict compliance with the statute, but we have 
also declared that substantial compliance with the 
statute is sufficient... 
369 P.2d at 530 (citation omitted). The Court also defined 
"substantial compliance11 to mean "only that a Court should 
determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so 
as to carry out the intent for which it was adopted. The intent 
of the legislation being the elimination of fraud.11 369 P. 2d at 
530 (citation omitted). Montana also has statutory and public 
policies requiring that "a liberal construction be given where 
possible to effect the testator's wishes. Klfn re. Estate of 
Birkeland, 519 P.2d 154, 156 (Mont. 1974). Kansas likewise 
adopted a similar policy: 
4 
The will of the testator should be carried out if 
reasonably possible and a substantial compliance with 
statutory requirements is enough. Slight or trifling 
departures from technical requirements will not operate 
to defeat a will. 
£n re. Estate of Perkins, 504 P.2d 564, 568 (Kan. 1972). See 
also^obbs v. Mahonev 478 P.2d 956, 958 (Okl. 1970). (The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopts the "substantial compliance 
doctrine;H literal compliance with the requisites pertaining to 
the execution of a will is not required). 
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, it is clear that 
the June 30, 1984 "Will and/or Codicil" of Grant Ross Taylor was 
executed in substantial compliance with the necessary requisites 
of Utah Code Annotated §75-2-502. The will was signed by Grant 
in the presence of both Noel Taylor and Geraldine Taylor, the 
attesting witnesses. Noel witnessed the will with his signature 
in the presence of both Grant and Geraldine, the second witness. 
Geraldine witnessed the will with her signature in the presence 
of Noel, the other witness. The only element lacking is that 
Geraldine failed to sign the instrument in the presence of Grant. 
However, the requirements which were literally complied with are 
sufficient to protect against fraud, the very purpose for which 
the requirements are imposed. Here it must be reiterated, as 
stated by Justice Wade, that: 
the legislative intent that our statutes shall "be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects 
5 
of the statutes and to promote justice" [UCA 68-3-2],.. 
was undoubtedly enacted to prevent the harsh results of 
following too literally the exact wording of the 
statutes, and, to my mind, was made for just such a 
case as we have here. 
In re. Alexander's Estate, 139 P.2d at 434. 
Further support for a liberal construction of the Utah 
Probate Code is found in the recent case of Estate of Grossen v. 
Vincent. 657 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1983). There the Utah Supreme Court 
considered a different section of the Probate Code, but stated: 
The [strict] interpretation urged by the appellants 
would make the decedent's will now invalid in this 
state; but it could be admitted to probate in any other 
state which had adopted the Uniform Probate Code. We 
will not lightly ascribe an interpretation which will 
produce such an incongruous result. 
657 P.2d at 1346. 
To require an absolute and strict compliance with section 
75-2-502 as it now reads would likewise result in an "incongruous 
result." The provision at issue in the present case is not a 
provision of the Standard Uniform Probate Code. The very purpose 
of the Code was to reduce the formalities for execution of a 
witnessed will to a minimum. (Editorial Board Comment to UCA§ 
75-2-502). The Utah statute, although worded slightly different-
ly from the standard Code, should be interpreted consistently 
with the intent of the Uniform Probate Code, and consistently 
6 
with other jurisdiction allowing for substantial compliance, and 
consistently with UCA §68-3-2 providing for liberal construction 
to promote justice and equity. 
CONCLUSION w 
Respectfully submitted this // day of February, 1986. 
(
 " y STANLEY S. ADAMS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
WENDELL E. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR, 
deceased, ESTHER TAYLOR, 
DARRON G. TAYLOR, and 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
DISMISSING ACTION WITH 
PREJUDICE, AND AWARDING 
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. C-85-6869 
Judge Raymond Uno 
* * * * * * * 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants1 
Motion for Attorneys Fees came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno on Thursday, February 20, 1986, at 
8:00 o'clock a.m. Defendants were represented by Leland S. 
McCullough, Esq. and P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq. Plaintiff was 
represented by Stanley S. Adams, Esq. Based upon the Memoranda 
EXHIBIT _£. 
filed herein, arguments of counsel, the Affidavit of P. Bryan 
Fishburn as to attorneys fees, and good cause appearing, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendants* Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted; 
2. That this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
and 
3. That Plaintiff is to pay to Defendants their 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defending against this 
action, such fees having been determined by the Court to be in 
the amount of $ O> <T*~* - ^ 
yzA^sJ ^ 
DATED f'<*~ ^ ^ / , 1986, 
BY THE COURT 
-prj^jrZ^t^S^^ 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Third District Court Judge 
: ? • ' "•'•• -' ATTEST 
CDN0643F H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Cle.* 
- 2 - *<^Wr^^&$%^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE. AND AWARDING 
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES was hand delivered this _> day of 
[ n p K T U 1986. to the following: 
Stanley S. Adams. Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
521 6th Avenue 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84103 
STATE OF UTAH ) „ 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKf ) * * 
I, THE UNDER3SON5D, CLEWC'OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, DO HEREBY 
C*»TIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND .FOREGOING IS 
A TRUE ANO FULL COf»V OF AN C*:G!NAL DOCU-
MENT ON FILE IN MY OFFiC€ AS SUCH CLER*. 
W5TNE58 MY HAND A I^O S£AL Of SAIO COURT 
TH>8 ...rZ, DAY OF
 f^Q<'^'^ 19 «Y. I I t . w Mi i W n l V f ft 'Mmm—mm-mm 
H. qn«ON HINCLEY, CLEjtfK *. 
7 i / DEPUTY 
'Forward", 8A Utah Code Ann., T i t l e 75 (1978) 
FOREWORD 
This volume contains the complete text of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code adopted by Chapter 150, Laws of 1975, as amended through the Second 
Special Session of the Forty-second Legislature, 1978. Various portions of 
this Uniform Probate Code, designated as Title 75, either embody, supersede, 
or conflict with statutes contained principally in Titles 74 and 75, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED. The Repealing Clause of Chapter 150 is set forth 
following Section 75-1-101. 
Annotations to decisions under the former law and later cases are in-
cluded through Volume 578 Pacific Reporter; 97 Supreme Court Reporter; 
575 Federal Reporter (2nd Series) and 449 Federal Supplement. Also con-
tained in this volume as notes, are the official Comments prepared by the 
Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, an arm of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Probate Code. The Comments 
have been edited occasionally for adaptation to the Utah version of the 
Code. 
The index to the Uniform Probate Code prepared by the Joint Editorial 
Board, modified in substance as required by variations in the Utah adoption, 
begins on page 319. 
Uniform Probate Code §2-502 (with commentary) 
6 
Wills: Execution, Deposit, and 
Contractual Arrangements 
(Parts 5, 7, and 9 of Article II) 
PAKT 5 
WILLS 
GENERAL COMMENT 
Part 5 of Article II deals with minimum, holographic wills 
capacity and formalities for ex- written and signed by the testa-
ecution and revocation of wills, tor are authorized, choice of law 
If the will is to be restored to its as to validity of execution is 
role as the major instrument for broadened, and revocation by 
disposition of wealth at death, its operation of law is limited to di-
execution must be kept simple, vorce or annulment. However, 
The basic intent of these sections the statute also provides for a 
is to validate the will whenever more formal method of execu-
possible. To this end, the age for tion with acknowledgment be-
making wills is lowered to eigh- fore a public officer (the self-
teen, formalities for a written proved will), 
and attested will are kept to a 
Section 2-501. [Who May Make a Will.] 
Any person 18 or more years of age who is of sound 
mind may make a will. 
COMMENT 
This section states a uniform is defined in Section 1-201, and 
minimum age of eighteen for ca- may involve a different age than 
pacity to execute a will. "Minor" that prescribed here. 
Section 2-502. [Sxocucion,] 
JExeent as prcv :ded for holographic wills, wri&iss 
within Secdun .\i-3I!?, end wills v/iLhin S-eci:cn 2-cC3, 
Uniform Probate Code §2-502 (with commentary) 
• THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 
every will shall be in writing signed by the testator or 
in the testator's name by some other person in the testa-
tor's presence and by his direction, and shall be Signed 
by at least 2 persons each of whom witnessed either the 
signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signa-
ture or of the will. 
COMMENT 
The formalities for execution 
of a witnessed will have been re-
duced to a minimum. Execution 
under this section normally 
would be accomplished by sig-
nature of the testator and of two 
witnesses; each of the persons 
signing as witnesses must "wit-
ness" any of the following: the 
signing of the will by the testa-
tor, an acknowledgment by the 
testator that the signature is his, 
or an acknowledgment by the 
testator that the document is his 
will. Signing by the testator may 
be by mark under general rules 
relating to what constitutes a sig-
nature; or the will may be signed 
on behalf of the testator by an-
other person signing the testa-
tor's name at his direction and 
in his presence. There is no re-
quirement that the testator pub-
lish the document as his will, or 
that he request the witnesses to 
sign, or that the witnesses sign 
in the presence of the testator or 
of each other. The testator may 
sign the will outside the presence 
of the witnesses if he later ac-
knowledges to the witnesses that 
the signature is his or that the 
document is his will, and they 
sign as witnesses. There is no re-
quirement that the testator's sig-
nature be at the end of the will; 
thus, if he writes his name in the 
body of the will and intends it to 
be his signature, this would sat-
isfy the statute. The intent is to 
validate wills that meet the min-
imal formalities of the statute. 
A will that does not meet these 
requirements may be valid under 
Section 2-503 as a holograph. 
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 (1953) 
CONSTRUCTION 68-3-2 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally 
construed — Rules of equity prevaiL 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
History. R~S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489; tion; law and equity administered in same ac-
C.L. 1917, § 5839; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943, tion, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec 19; Rule 2, 
88-2-2. U.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — One form of civil ac-
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-11 (1953) 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law. or are 
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appro-
priate meaning or definition. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2497; Cross-References. — Duty of court to con-
CX. 1917, § 5847; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, strue statutes, § 78-21-3. 
88-2-11. 
.,, i
 S/A^ 'fl953, 1976 reprint ed.) Utah Code Ann §74-1-5(4) U ^ , ^ 
(repealed 1975 effec. 1977) 
744-5. Manner of execution and attestation.—Every will, other than 
a nuncupative will, must be in writing, and every will, other than an 
olographic or a nuncupative will, must be executed and attested as follows: 
(1) It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself; 
(2) The subscription must be made in the presence of the attesting 
witnesses; 
(3) The testator must at the time of subscribing the same declare 
to the attesting witnesses that the instrument is his will; and, 
(4) There must be two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign 
his name as a witness at the end of the will, at the testator's request, in 
his presence, and in the presence of the other. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §2735; 
C. L. 1917, § 6315; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
101-1-5. 
/ / 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 5 - 1 - 1 0 2 (1978) 
75-1-102. Purposes—Rule of construction.—(1) This code shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of dece-
dents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated 
persons; 
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distri-
bution of his property; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the 
estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors; 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(20) (Supp. 1986, as amended 1979) 
DEFINITIONS 75-1-201 
(20) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, 
creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or 
claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or pro-
tected person which may be affected by the proceeding. It also includes 
persons having priority for appointment as personal representative and 
other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it 
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must be de-
termined according to the particular purposes of, and matters involved 
in, any proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 1 (1978) 
75-2-101. Intestate estate,—Any part of the estate of a decedent not 
effectively disposed of by his will passes to his heirs as prescribed in 
the following sections of this code. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-101, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §3, 
;?/ 
U t a h Code Ann. § 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 2 (1978) 
75-2-102. Share of the spouse.—(1) The intestate share of the 
surviving spouse is: 
(a) If there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the 
entire intestate estate; 
(b) If there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by 
a parent or parents, the first $100,000, plus one-half of the balance of 
the intestate estate; 
(c) If there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the sur-
viving spouse also, the first $50,000, plus one-half of the balance of the 
intestate estate; 
(d) If there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue 
of the surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-102, enacted . . . . 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 3 (1978) 
75-2-103. Share of heirs other than surviving spouse,—(1) The 
part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse under 
section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving 
spouse, passes as follows: 
(a) To the issue of the decedent by representation. 
(b) If there is no surviving issue, to his parent or parents equally. 
(c) If there is no surviving issue or parent, to the issue of the 
parents or either of them by representation. 
(d) If there is no surviving issue, parent, or issue of a parent, 
but the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or issue of 
grandparents, half of the estate passes to the paternal grandparents if 
both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the issue 
of the paternal grandparents if both are deceased, the issue taking by 
representation; and the other half passes to the maternal relatives in 
the same manner; but if there be no surviving grandparent or issue of 
grandparent on either the paternal or the maternal side, the entire 
estate passes to the relatives on the other side in the same manner as 
the half. 
(e) If there is no surviving issue, parent or issue of a parent, 
grandparent or issue of a grandparent, then the entire estate passes 
to the next kin in equal degree, excepting that when there are two or 
more collateral kindred in equal degree, but claiming through different 
ancestors, those who claim through the nearest ancestor must be pre-
ferred to those claiming through an ancestor more remote. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-103, enacted • • ' * 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3. 
de Ann. §75-2-502 (1978) 
75-2-502, Execution,—Except as provided for holographic wills, writ-
ings within section 75-2-513, and wills within section 75-2-506, every 
will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name 
by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and 
shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed either 
the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the 
will., The signing by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence 
and in the presence of each other. 
History: C 1953, 75-2-502, enacted 
by U 1975, cfa. 150, § 3. 
Editorial Board Comment. 
The formalities for execution of a wit-
nessed will have been reduced to a mini-
mum. Execution under this section nor-
mally would be accomplished by signa-
ture of the testator and of two witnesses; 
each of the persons signing as witnesses 
must "witness" any of the following: 
the signing of the will by the testator, 
an acknowledgment by the testator that 
the signature is his, or an acknowledg-
ment by the testator that the document 
is his will. Signing by the testator may 
be by mark under general rules relating 
to what constitutes a signature; or the 
will may be signed on behalf of the 
testator by another person signing the 
testator's name at his direction and in 
his presence. There is no requirement 
that the testator publish the document 
as his will, or that he request the wi& 
nesses to sign, or that the witnesses 
sijrn in the presence of the testator or of 
each other. The testator may sign the 
will outside the presence of the witnesses 
if he later acknowledges to the witnesses 
that the signature is his or that the docu-
ment is his will, and they sign as wit-
nesses. [Last sentence in Utah version 
omitted in official text of Code.] There 
is no requirement that the testator's 
signature be at the end of the will; thus, 
if he writes his name in the body of 
the will and intends it to be his signa-
ture, this would satisfy the statute. The 
intent is to validate wills which meet 
the minimal formalities of the statute. 
A will which does not meet these re-
quirements may be valid under section 
75-2-503 as a holograph. 
Cross- References. 
Probate and administration, 75-3-101 
et seq. 
Proof of will, 78-25-12. 
Collateral References. 
Wills<S=3lll, 113-123. 
94 CJ.S. Wills §§ 169-177,182-197. 
79 Am. Jur. 2d 430, Wills § 210. 
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic 
Service, Uniform Probate Code. 
Admissibility and credibility of testi-
mony of subscribing witness tending to 
impeach execution of will or testamen-
tary capacity of testator, 79 A. L. R. 
394. 
Admissibility of evidence other than 
testimony of subscribing witnesses to 
prove due execution of will, or testa-
mentary capacity, 63 A. L. R. 1195. 
Admissibility of testator's declarations 
upon issue of genuineness or due execu-
tion of purported will, 62 A. L. R. 2d 
855. 
Assistance: validity of will signed by 
testator with the assistance of another, 
98 A. L. R. 2d 824. 
14Attestation" or "witnessing" of will, 
required by statute, as including wit-
nesses1 subscription, 45 A. L. R. 2d 1365. 
Beneficiary under nuncupative will as 
witness thereto, 23 A. L. R. 2d 796. 
Character as w i t n e s s of one who 
signed will for another purpose, 8 A . L 
R. 1075. 
Character of instrument as will, or its 
admissibility to probate as such, as af-
fected by its failure to make any dis-
position of property or by fact that 
there is no beneficiary entitled to take 
thereunder, 147 A. L. R. 636. 
Codicil as affecting application of stat-
utory provision to will, or previous codi-
cil not otherwise subject, or as obviating 
objections to lack of testamentary ca-
i Code Ann. §75-3-303(3) (1978) 
i 
75-3-303. Informal probate—Proof and findings required.—(1) In 
an informal proceeding for original probate of a will, the registrar shall 
determine whether: 
(a) The application is complete; 
(b) The applicant has made oath or affirmation that the statements 
contained in the application are true to the best of his knowledge and 
belief; 
(c) The applicant appears from the application to be an interested 
person as defined in subsection 75-1-201 (20); 
(d) On the basis of the statements in the application, venue is 
proper; 
(e) An original, duly executed and apparently unrevoked will is in 
the registrar's possession; 
(f) Any notice required by section 75-3-204 has been given and that 
the application is not within section 75-3-304; and 
(g) It appears from the application that the time limit for original 
probate has not expired. 
(2) The application shall be denied if it indicates that a personal 
representative has been appointed in another county of this state or 
except as provided in subsection (4) below, if it appears that this or 
another wUl of the decedent has been the subject of a previous probate 
order. 
(3) A will which appears to have the required signatures and which 
contains an attestation clause showing that requirements of execution 
under sections 75-2-502, 75-2-503, or 75-2-506 have been met shall be 
probated without further proof. In other cases, the registrar may as-
sume execution if the will appears to have been properly executed, or he 
may accept a sworn statement or affidavit of any person having knowl-
edge of the circumstances of execution, whether or not the person was a 
witness to the will. 
(4) Informal probate of a will which has been previously probated 
elsewhere may be granted at any time upon written application by any 
interested person, together with deposit of an authenticated copy of the 
will and of the statement probating it from the office or court where 
it was first probated. 
(5) A will from a place which does not provide for probate of a will 
after death and which is not eligible for probate under subsection (1) 
above may be probated in this state upon receipt by the registrar of a 
duly authenticated copy of the will and a duly authenticated certificate 
of its legal custodian that the copy filed is a true copy and that the will 
has become operative under the law of the other place. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-303, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch, 150, §4. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-401 (1978) 
Part 4 
Formal Testacy and Appointment Proceedings 
75-3-401. Formal testacy proceedings—Nature—When commenced.— 
(1) A formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a 
decedent left a valid will. A formal testacy proceeding may be com-
menced by an interested person filing a petition as described in sub-
section 75-3-402 (1) in which he requests, that the court, after notice 
and hearing, enter an order probating a will, or a petition to set aside 
an informal probate of a will or to prevent informal probate of a will 
which is the subject of a pending application, or a petition in accordance 
with subsection 75-3-402 (3) for an order that the decedent died intes-
tate. 
(2) A petition may seek formal probate of a will without regard 
to whether the same or a conflicting will has been informally probated. 
A formal testacy proceeding may, but need not, involve a request for 
appointment of a personal representative. 
(3) During the pendency of a formal testacy proceeding, the regis-
trar shall not act upon any application for informal probate of any 
will of the decedent or any application for informal appointment of a 
personal representative of the decedent. 
(4) Unless a petition in a formal testacy proceeding also requests 
confirmation of the previous informal appointment, a previously ap-
pointed personal representative, after receipt of notice of the commence-
ment of a formal probate proceeding, must refrain from exercising his 
power to make any further distribution of the estate during the pend-
ency of the formal proceeding. A petitioner who seeks the appointment 
of a different personal representative in a formal proceeding also may 
request an order restraining the acting personal representative from 
exercising any of the powers of his office and requesting the appoint-
ment of a special administrator. In the absence of a request, or if the 
request is denied, the commencement of a formal proceeding has no 
effect on the powers and duties of a previously appointed personal 
representative other than those relating to distribution. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-401, enacted r 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4 ; L. 1977, ch. 194, 
§27. 
& 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 5 - 3 - 4 0 2 (1978) 
75-3-402. Formal testacy or appointment proceedings—Petition— 
Contents.—(1) Petitions for formal probate of a will, or for ad-
judication of intestacy with or without request for appointment of a 
personal representative, must be directed to the court, request a judicial 
order after notice and hearing, and contain further statements as 
indicated in this section. A petition for formal probate of a will: 
(a) Requests an order as to the testacy of the decedent in relation 
to a particular instrument which may or may not have been informally 
probated and determining the heirs; 
(b) Contains the statements required for informal applications as 
stated in subsection 75-3-301 (2) and the statements required by sub-
sections 75-3-301 (3) (b) ahd (c), and, if the petition requests appoint-
ment of a personal representative, the statements required by subsection 
75-3-301 (4); and 
(c) States whether the original of the last will of the decedent 
is in the possession of the court or accompanies the petition. 
(2) If the original will is neither in the possession of the court 
nor accompanies the petition and no authenticated copy of a will 
probated in another jurisdiction accompanies the petition, the petition 
also must state the contents of the will and indicate that it is lost, 
destroyed, or otherwise unavailable. 
(3) A petition for adjudication of intestacy and appointment of an 
administrator in intestacy must request a judicial finding and order 
that the decedent left no will and determining the heirs, contain the 
statements required by subsections 75-3-301 (2) and 75-3-301 (5) and 
indicate whether supervised administration is sought A petition may 
request an order determining intestacy and heirs without requesting 
the appointment of an administrator, in which case, the statements 
required by subsection 75-3-301 (5) (b) above may be omitted. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-402, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4; L. 1977, ch. 194, 
§23. 
?7 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 5 - 3 - 4 0 9 (1978) 
75-3-409. Formal testacy proceedings—Order—Foreign will.—After 
the time required for any notice has expired, upon proof of notice, 
and after any hearing that may be necessary, if the court finds that 
the testator is dead, venue is proper and that the proceeding was com-
menced within the limitation prescribed by section 75-3-107, it shall 
determine the decedent's domicile at death, his heirs, and his state of 
testacy. Any will found to be valid and unrevoked shall be formally 
probated. Termination of any previous informal appointment of a per-
sonal representative, which may be appropriate in view of the relief 
requested and findings, is governed by section 75-3-612. The petition 
shall be dismissed or appropriate amendment allowed if the court is 
not satisfied that the alleged decedent is dead. A will from a place 
which does not provide for probate of a will after death may be proved 
for probate in this state by a duly authenticated certificate of its legal 
custodian that the copy introduced is a true copy and that the will has 
become effective under the law of the other place. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-409, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-703.(1) . ' (1978) 
75-3-703. General duties—Relation and liability to persons interested 
in estate—Standing to sue,—(1) A personal representative is a fidu-
ciary who shall observe the standard of care applicable to trustees as 
described by section 75-7-302. A personal representative is under a duty 
to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with 
the terms of any probated and effective will and this code and as ex-
peditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of 
the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by this code, 
the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which 
he is party for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
*\s: 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 7 - 5 6 (Supp. 1986) 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-57 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith. 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, 
the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1. I-
Utah R. App. p.
 2 (with Advisory Commi t t e e Note) 
Rule 2. Suspension of Rules, 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the Supreme Court on its own 
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of 
Rules 4(a), 4(e) and 5(a), suspend the requirements or provisions of any of 
these Rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case in 
accordance with its direction. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The principal objective of this Rule is to 
reaffirm the power of the Supreme Court to 
or avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice. 
It is not intended by this Rule that the time 
fixed for taking an appeal to or seeking review 
by the Supreme Court may be extended or 
suspended. Rule 22(b) prohibits the Supreme 
suspend any one or more of these Rules in 
order to either expedite the appellate process 
Court from extending or suspending the t i ^ l l 
for appeal or review and the district coun ^ ' 
likewise prohibited except as provided hv D K H 
4(e). y "^a-
U t a h R. App. P . 3 ( a ) 
. > *& 
-*x4 
V-$J \r±v& 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND '38 
ORDERS OF DISTRICT COURTS. "1 
Rule 3o Appeal as of Right: How Taken. 
(a) Filing Appeal from Final Orders and Judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from all final orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure 
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal 
of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of 
attorney's fees. 
Utah R. App. 4 ( w i t h A d v i s o r y Committee Note) 
Rule 4. Appeal as of Right: When Taken. 
(a) Appeal from Final Judgment and Order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of.the judgment or order 
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions Post Judgment or Order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: (1) for 
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would b P l 
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend th-f^ 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all ^fl 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting ^P 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the "^1 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the district court by any party ^1 
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after r 
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing Prior to Entry of Judgment or Order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this Rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or Cross Appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this Rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of Time to Appeal. The district court, upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this Rule. Any such motion which is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district 
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after 
expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in 
accordance with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed 
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
2-Z 
Utah R. App 4 (with Advisory Committee Note) 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph (a). Coupled with Rule 3, this 
paragraph requires that a notice of appeal be 
filed with the clerk of the district court within 
30 days after the date of entry of judgment or 
order from which the appeal is taken. There 
are two significant changes in appellate proce-
dure from prior practice under Rule 73(a) 
URCivP: (1) the time frame within which the 
appeal must be taken is 30 days rather than 
one month: and (2) the 30-day period com-
mences to run after the date of the "entry of 
the judgment or order" rather than "from the 
date of the entry of the judgment or order in 
the Register of Actions''. 
The one month time frame under prior Rule 
73(a) was determined to be both inconsistent 
and confusing, at least measured against a 
more definite 30-day time limit. Computation 
of time is defined under Rule 22(a). It is 
intended that the 30-day time limit within 
which to appeal from a final judgment or order 
of the district court or a juvenile court shall be 
applicable in all cases, notwithstanding a 
statute or other rule to the contrary (see 78-2-4 
Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended), with the. 
'exception that in statutory forcible entry and 
:
 unlawful detainer actions, an appeal shall be 
taJcen within 10 days from the entry of the 
final judgment or order appealed from. The 30-
jjay time limit will qualify the "one month" 
appeal period set out in 78-3a-51 Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 as amended, for a direct appeal from 
a juvenile court. 
Because of the conversion to microfilm filing 
process by the clerks of the various district 
courts, the Register of Actions Book is no 
longer maintained in some counties as contem-
plated in prior Rule 73(a) and 79(a) URCivP. 
The date of "entry of the judgment or order' 
from which the appeal is taken is considered to 
be the day on which the judgment or order is 
"filed" with the district court clerk. See Rule 
58A(c) URCivP. It is the Committee's judg-
ment that when the clerk receives and stamps-
in the judgment or order, the document is 
"filed" under Rule 58A and under this Rule 4. 
This paragraph requires that a notice of 
appeal from a final judgment or order in a 
criminal case be filed within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from, State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 
1981), except that in a capital case where the 
death sentence has been imposed, the case is 
automatically appealed to and reviewed by the 
Court. Rule 26(h) URCrimP. It is the Commit-
tee's view that even in capital cases involving 
the death sentence, a notice of appeal should be 
filed under this paragraph so that the appel-
late process incident to preparation and trans-
mittal of the record may commence in a timely 
manner. 
Paragraph (h). This paragraph retains the 
concept under prior Rule 73(a) URCivP that a 
timely filed motion under Rule 50(b). 52(b) or 
Rule 59 shall toll the date from which the time 
for appeal commences to run. In the event of 
such a motion, the time for appeal under 
paragraph (a) commences from the date of 
entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other motion. The 
paragraph adopts the provision of Rule 4(a)(4) 
FRAP that a notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of a motion under Rule 50(b), 52(b), 
or 59 has no effect and must be filed within the 
prescribed time after the entry of the order by 
the district court disposing of the motion. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no coun-
terpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in substan-
tial part, an adoption of Rule 4(a)(2) FRAP. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the 
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals 
(see prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires 
that a notice of the cross-appeal be filed within 
14 days after the date of the first notice of 
appeal. The paragraph adopts substantially 
the time period and concept of cross-appeal in 
Rule 4(a)(3) FRAP. 
Paragraph (eh This paragraph retains the 
prior practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that 
the time for filing a notice of appeal may be 
extended by the district court, upon a showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause, if a motion 
for extension is filed not later than 30 days 
after the expiration of the time prescribed in 
paragraphs (a) or (b). The application shall be 
on motion and may be ex parte (although ex 
parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior 
to the expiration of the time for appeal. The 
district court may not grant an extension 
exceeding 30 days past the original time for 
appeal or 10 days from the date of entry of the 
order granting the motion, whichever occurs 
later. Excusable neglect or good cause under 
this paragraph refers generally to an extraor-
dinary circumstance that prevented the 
movant from filing a timely notice of appeal 
and not to inadvertence or oversight on the 
part of counsel or to the failure of the client to 
authorize an appeal. 
I. General Consideration. 
II. When Appeal to Be Taken. 
III. Cross-Appeals. 3</ 
R. App. P. 22(b) 
Rule 22. Computation and Enlargement of Time. 
(a) Computation of Time. In computing any period of time prescribed by 
these Rules, by an order of the Court, or by any applicable statute, the day of 
the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to 
run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless 
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period 
extends until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded 
in the computation. As used in this Rule "legal holiday" includes days 
designated as holidays by the President, the Congress of the United States or 
the State of Utah. 
(b) Enlargement of Time. The Court for good cause shown may upon motion 
enlarge the time prescribed by these Rules or by its order for doing any act, or 
may permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time, but the Court 
- i 
may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal, or a petition for review ! 
from an order of an administrative agency, except as specifically authorized 
by law. A motion for enlargement of time shall: 
(1) state with particularity the reasons for granting the motion; 
(2) state whether the movant has previously been granted an enlarge-
ment of time, and if so, the number and duration of such enlargements; 
and 
(3) state when the time will expire for doing the act for which' the 
enlargement of time is sought. 
(c) Ex Parte Motion. Except as to enlargements of time for filing and 
service of briefs under Rule 26(a), a party may file one ex parte motion for 
enlargement of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has been 
previously granted, if the time has not already expired for doing the act for 
which the enlargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with 
the requirements and limitations of paragraph (b) of this Rule. 
(d) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a party is required or 
permitted to do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper upon 
him and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed 
period. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph (a). This Rule on computation 
and enlargement of time comports with prior 
practice and procedure in Utah, see Rule 6(a), 
(b) and (e), URCivP, and follows the principal 
provisions of Rule 26, FRAP. 
Paragraph (c). For judicial convenience and 
flexibility in the time requirements of an 
appeal, this paragraph allows for a filing of one 
ex parte motion for an enlargement of time not 
to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has 
been previously granted, if the motion is 
supported by good cause, and if the time has 
not already expired for doing the act for which 
the enlargement is sought. However, the para-
graph does not permit an ex parte motion for 
an enlargement of time for the filing of appel-
late briefs under Rule 26. Moreover, this 
paragraph does not authorize an ex parte 
motion for an enlargement of time to die a 
notice of appeal or a petition for review. See 
paragraph lb). 
• Civ. P. 11 (prior to 1985 Amendment) 
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings 
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed in his individual name by at least one attorney who 
is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The address of 
the attorney and that of the party shall be stated. Every party 
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleadings 
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically pro-
vided by rule, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by 
an affidavit The signature of any attorney constitutes a certifi-
cate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to sup-
port it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not 
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule 
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed 
as though the pleading had not been filed. For a wilful violation 
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate discipli-
nary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or inde-
cent matter is inserted. 
& 
Utah R. C i v . P . 11 ' ( a s . amended, e f f e c . S e p t . 4 , 
(1986 M i c h i e p a p e r b o u n d e d . ) 
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; 
Sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual 
name who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's 
address also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney 
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be 
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of 
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or 
of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The 
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, 
or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, 
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4,1985.) 
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Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a) (as p r i o r to amendment.effee. J a n . 1, 1987) 
Rule 52. Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute 
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes 
of review. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the court. Findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 
56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 4Kb). 
5? 
Utah R. C iv P . 56 "• 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment 
(a) For Claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the com-
mencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(c) was amended by the Supreme Court on 
June 30, 1965t effective October 1, 1965. The amendment inserted "an-
swers to interrogatories" in the third sentence. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evi-
dence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts ire actually and in good faith contro-
verted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts 
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent 
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
3* 
< 
Utah R. C i v . P . 56 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies 
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for sum-
mary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, sum-
mary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(e) was amended by the Supreme Court 
on June 30, 1965. effective October 1, 1965. The amendment added the 
words "Defense Required" in the caption, inserted "answers to interroga-
tories" after "depositions" and deleted the word "by" before "further 
affidavits" in the third sentence, and added the last two sentences. 
If) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits pre-
sented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay* the court shall forthwith order the party 
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him 
to incur, reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Utah R. C i v . P . 58A(c) and (d ) (1986 pape rbound Mich ie e d . ) 
Rule 58A UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58A 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of Actions and Judgment 
Docket A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, 
except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is signed and 
filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall 'immediately make a notation 
of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. 
¥/ 
Utah R. Civ. P. 58(c) and (d) (1953 and Supp. 1986) 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of Actions and 
Judgment Docket A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered 
for ail purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when 
the same is signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall 
^mediately make a notation of the judgment in the register of actions 
and the judgment docket. 
(d) Judgment After Death of a Party. If a party dies after a verdict 
' or decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may 
nevertheless be rendered thereon. 
Utah R. C i v . P . 5 8 ( c ) and (d) (Supp . 1986) 
.;,;';• JUDGMENT Rule 59 
(c) When Judgement Entered; Notation in Register of Actions and 
Judgment Docket 
"Filed." sented to the Court, is necessary before a 
Compliance with Rule 2.9(b), Rules of Prac- judgment is considered "filed" under this rule 
tice — Dist. and Cir. Ct, which requires that and, therefore, appealable. Wayne GarfF 
a copy of proposed findings or judgments be Constr. Co. v. Richards (Utah 1985) 706 P.2d 
served on opposing counsel before being pre- 1065. 
(d) Judgment After Death of a Party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may never-
theless be rendered thereon. 
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